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In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled “Ontic explanation is either ontic
or explanatory, but not both,” Cory Wright and Dingmar van Eck have sought to
undermine any ontic approach to explanation, providing three arguments to show
that an epistemic approach is “the only game in town.”
I show that each of their arguments is straightforwardly question-begging.
For brevity, I make my counter-arguments by showing how the claims of
Sheredos (2016) – whom Wright & van Eck cite as an ally – undermine each of
their own arguments. The consumer update is: there is no new decisive argument
against an ontic view, the epistemic view is not the only game in town, and
reconciliation between the ontic and epistemic views remains possible.
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1. Introduction
There has been a dispute in philosophy of science about how to understand “explanation.” Roughly:
construed from an ontic perspective, “explanation” is taken to refer to mind-independent ontic
structures which cause, constitute, or are otherwise responsible for the production of explananda;
construed from an epistemic perspective, “explanation” is taken to refer to the communicative and
cognitive acts and representations whereby intentional agents account for, make intelligible, and
understand the occurrence of explananda.
Sheredos (2016) argued that the epistemic and ontic views can be reconciled, after a fashion.
In his view, briefly: (i) there are a plurality of ways scientists can succeed when they seek an
explanation, (ii) some of those successes might be analyzed as locating an ontic explanation,
whereas others can only be adequately analyzed from an epistemic perspective, so (iii) the ontic
and epistemic views can help provide complementary (rather than rival) analyses of norms of
distinct kinds of explanatory success. In particular, Sheredos claimed an ontic approach may
provide relevant analyses of success involving singular explanation (e.g., an explanation of how a
token neuron fires a token action potential), whereas only epistemic views provide suitable analyses
of general explanation (e.g., an explanation of why, typically, typical neurons fire typical action
potentials).
The first step on Sheredos’ road to reconciliation is recognizing (a) that “explanation” is used
to mean several different things by different parties to the epistemic-ontic debate, and (b) that
there is no vantage point in this debate from which either party can acquire the authority to insist,
a priori, that any of these uses of the term is somehow “illegitimate.” Sheredos characterized
recognition of these points as a Quinean “semantic ascent.” Recent work by both ontic (Craver,
2014) and epistemic theorists (van Eck, 2015) shows both sides are sometimes willing to make
the semantic ascent. The effect is to cease any argument over whether any party to the dispute
is permitted to at least try to mean what they like by the term “explanation.” I consider this an
advance in the debate.1 To amplify Sheredos’ remarks, semantic ascent is glossed by Quine as
“a shift from talk of objects to talk of words,” for example “the shift from talk of miles to talk of
‘mile”’ (1960, p.250). He elaborated further:
“The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion into a domain where
both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on the main terms
concerning them. Words, or their inscriptions, unlike points, miles, classes, and
the rest, are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men
of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best. The strategy is one of
ascending to a common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes,
the better to discuss the disparate foundations. No wonder it helps in philosophy”
(1960, p.251).
Sheredos’ “semantic ascent” is not meant to leave us arguing over words. Rather, it is a
preliminary step that asks each side of the epistemic-ontic debate to recognize what the other
1Wright & van Eck disparage this as a “Humpty Dumpty theory of language” in their fn.20.
Charm aside, I do not see how one can hope to convince ontic theorists that they are not permitted
to use the word to mean what they intend. My aim is to show that none of the arguments in the
article under discussion fulfills this hope.
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means to say, preventing merely verbal disputes and question-begging arguments. Its true value
is that it clears the way for a second important development in the recent debate: what Sheredos
called (following comments by Illari 2013) “the normative turn.” Once clarity has been attained
regarding what disputants might mean by “explanation,” we can get to work on the true task for
philosophy of explanation: articulating the norms which govern scientific success in pursuing
explanations (in whatever sense one cares to employ). No sense of “explanation” is off-limits at
the outset; each is permitted to pay its way in philosophical dividends as far as it can. The closest
relevant thing we have to a test for the “legitimacy” of any sense of “explanation” is simply the
extent to which it can do good philosophical work in helping us analyze scientific practice. We
might eventually decide some sense of “explanation” does no relevant work and might discard it
as not useful in our philosophical accounts. Until then, reconciliation is to be found (if at all) by
determining a sensible division of philosophical labor between the two views.
In a recent article, Wright & van Eck encourage us to discard the ontic sense of “explanation,”
advancing three arguments to convince us that “the epistemic conception is more or less the only
game in town” (2018, p.997). It seems to me that each of their three arguments fails to make the
semantic ascent, fails to take the normative turn, and straightforwardly begs the question against
the ontic theorist, in just the way Sheredos cautioned against. That is what I seek to show below.
2. WvE’s First Argument: the “Master Argument”
In their first argument, Wright & van Eck (hereafter, “WvE”) suppose the ontic theorists’ “master
argument” is as follows:
“ (1) Speakers equivocate on the term explanation.
(2) Speakers equivocate over the term explanation only if the term explanation is ambiguous.
∴ (3) The term explanation is ambiguous.
∴ (4) The term explanation has multiple senses.
(5) Of these multiple senses, one philosophically legitimate sense of explanation is the ontic
sense.
(6) All other non-ontic senses of explanation mean explanatory texts.
(7) Explanatory texts are not actual [i.e., ‘philosophically legitimate’]2 explanations,
but representations of them.
∴ (8) Actual [i.e., ‘philosophically legitimate’] explanations are ontic ” (2018, p.1010).
2Insertions in square brackets clarify WvE’s intended argument. If all that is meant by “actual
explanation” in (7) and (8) is that ontic explanations have mind-independent existence (unlike
epistemic explanations), then (7) and (8) would be true (if at all) by stipulation, and no argument
would be required to derive them.
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(7) and (8) are bold claims. I am not entirely certain who among ontic theorists is committed to
them, but set that aside for now.3 For WvE, the sticking point is the transition to (5)-(8):
“...the core issue is whether, given (3) and (4) explanation is ambiguous in a way that
would render (5) true. In recognizing this much, what one recognizes is something
that has not been clear in the literature on explanation: the legitimacy of an ontic
sense of explanation is not automatically secured by that term’s ambiguity. Whether
or not (5) is true, there is no valid inference from any of (1)-(4) to it. To make it
valid, advocates of OC would need to add a further premise. But which suppressed
premise is that?” (2018, p.1011).
I agree with WvE that the “philosophical legitimacy” of an ontic sense of “explanation” cannot be
derived from its ambiguity. Making the semantic ascent grants the ambiguity but does not validate
the utility of an ontic conception of explanation.
The problem is thatWvE do not seem to recognize that there is any path (“suppressed premise”)
the ontic theorist can use to promote claims (5)-(8). The normative turn cautions precisely against
trying to derive (5)-(8) from (1)-(4) and recommends an alternative: establish the “legitimacy” of
the ontic sense (if at all) through its utility in analyses of scientific practice. WvE, by contrast, are
fixated on pieces of language. To challenge the “master argument,” they examine the statements
that ontic theorists might use to identify an ontic explanation: e.g., “the operations of sodium and
potassium channels explain the action potential.” They sometimes call these “IR-expressions” to
indicate that they are intended, by the ontic theorist, to refer to mind-independent ontic explanations
(“things”) in re. They seem to think that the following example, taken from Ruben (1990, p.162),
provides a decisive argument against the ontic view:
“(13) The hurricane explains the loss of life.
(14) The hurricane is the event reported in The Times on Tuesday.
———————————————————————————
∴ (15) The event reported in The Times on Tuesday explains the loss of life” (Wright & van
Eck, 2018, p.1013).
It is supposed the ontic theorist maintains that (13) and (15) are literally true. Following Ruben,
WvE assert that (15) is not literally true. Following Ruben, their diagnosis is that (13) also cannot
be literally true. To them, this shows the ontic sense of explanation cannot be “philosophically
legitimate.” I offer three responses.
First, I cannot see why ontic theorists should be willing to follow WvE in thinking that (13)
and (15) cannot be literally true. WvE seem to presume that (15) simply cannot be read as an
IR-expression. Yet I do not see why one cannot refer to a mind-independent event in re using an
expression like “the event described in The Times.” The claim the ontic theorist would intend to
3WvE believe that “explanatory text” is used by ontic theorists to evade recognition of any
epistemic sense of “explanation” – see esp. their fn.21. I disagree: Craver (2014) is explicit in
recognizing that explanatory texts are explanations, in an epistemic sense. By my lights, Craver
rejects (7) and (8) and WvE misunderstand (6).
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make with (15) is not that the description of the event, appearing in The Times, ontically explains
the loss of life; the claim is that the event (which, incidentally, was described in The Times) ontically
explains the loss of life. WvE seem not to understand (15) in this way, since they seem to think
it is in any way relevant that the event was described in The Times. On an ontic view, how and
when we describe an event is irrelevant to its status as an ontic explanation. It is not even relevant
whether we describe it as “a hurricane” rather than as “a tropical storm.” The claim is that that
ontic structure (describe it however you like – or don’t) ontically explains (causes, constitutes, or
is otherwise responsible for) the loss of life.
Second, and relatedly, WvE’s reading of (15) seems to presuppose an epistemic conception of
“explanation,” on which descriptions affect how some intentional subject understands what counts
as explanatory for that subject. Ruben (1990), from whom WvE borrow both the hurricane-Times
case and their diagnosis of it, explicitly presupposes an epistemic conception of explanation, on
which explanation is always at least a “triadic relation” involving explanans, explanandum, and
a person (1990, p.156). In defending his diagnosis of hurricane-Times cases, Ruben remarks: “I
grant that the person who knows the identities might feel reluctant to count the conclusions as
wholly literal falsehoods, since there is a sense in which he can see what the conclusions are trying
to get at. The conclusions mention events which, when differently described, do explain” (1990,
p.164, original emph.). This is far from the mark: the ontic theorist does not intend for any hearer’s
knowledge of an ontic explanation, or any particular manner of describing an ontic explanation,
to influence, in any way, what is an ontic explanation. Ontic explanations are to be events in re,
not events-under-a-description-as-understood-by-a-subject. WvE fail to make the semantic ascent,
refusing to permit the ontic theorist to mean what they intend to mean by talk of ontic explanation,
and their argument thus presupposes an epistemic conception, and begs the question.
Third, neither of my foregoing rejoinders “legitimates” talk of ontic explanations and none of
it could. The relevant path to “legitimacy” is to take the normative turn and put the concept to
work in analyses of scientific practice. I agree with WvE that the “master argument” is a bad route
to securing an ontic view, but challenging this argument is an equally bad route to undermining
an ontic view. The productive epistemic-ontic debate is a debate in philosophy of science, not
philosophy of language. It is not entirely clear fromWvE’s remarks who among ontic theorists has
pursued this master argument: perhaps the historical roots of the ontic view rest on bad arguments.
But any ontic theorist now willing to abandon this argument and make the normative turn can
proceed to try to secure the utility of an ontic conception of explanation on good grounds that WvE
do not consider.
3. WvE’s Second Argument: General Explanation
Sheredos (2016) argued that ontic views cannot account for general explanations at the level of
types. He took this to secure the value of an epistemic conception of general explanations, but
did not regard it as a landslide victory: he permitted the ontic view to retain its value in cases of
singular explanation, and so sought reconciliation.
WvE nominally endorse Sheredos’ line of thought, but they declare they are pursuing “a
different, more penetrating criticism of [the ontic view]: the demand for generalized explanations
lands [the ontic view] in a dilemma in which being ontic trades off against being explanatory”
(2018, fn.22). Their argument relies on the supposition that “the explanations that matter most to
the scientific community are those [general explanations] implicating classes of activities or events,
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kinds of mechanisms, types of causal processes, and so forth” (2018, p.1019). On these grounds
they attempt to pose a dilemma:
“If explanations must generalize or abstract away from the details of singular cau-
sation to have genuine scientific import or interest, then, pace Salmon, explanations
cannot be ontic. But if they are ontic and so cannot involve abstracta and gen-
era, which have no causal powers, then those explanations will be without genuine
scientific import and interest” (2018, p.1019).
WvE presume there can be no value to the ontic sense of explanation, simply because it (arguably)
cannot be deployed to analyze norms of general explanation. Generality is treated as essential for
all scientific explanation, so the failure of the ontic view to accommodate generality is treated as
global failure.
I see no reason whatsoever for the ontic theorist to cede this toWvE. In one (epistemic) sense of
“explanation,” generality is constitutive of explanatory success, and (if arguments like Sheredos’ are
apt) an ontic view cannot accommodate this. But singular explanations do not involve generality,
and there is genuine scientific work do be done in singular cases, and genuine philosophical work
to be done in understanding it. Arguably, the ontic account can pull weight here: Craver (2007,
ch.2) seems to analyze singular explanation in neuroscience from an ontic perspective. WvE’s
second argument simply demands that ontic explanations all be epistemically explanatory (in the
specific way general explanations are). But ontic explanations aren’t intended to be epistemically
explanatory. Again, the semantic ascent is not made, the ontic sense of “explanation” is not
recognized, and the argument begs the question by presuming that explanations must be epistemic.
4. WvE’s Third Argument: Ontic Constraints
WvE’s third argument tries to sketch an “inconsistent triad” in Craver’s Explaining the Brain:
“...Craver asserts that explanations are ontic, and that ontic explanations aren’t good
or bad, and that one of his main projects is to clarify the norms of good and bad
explanations. But how can these three claims comport with one another? If actual
explanations are ontic and ontic explanations aren’t good or bad, then there seem to
be no norms of good and bad explanations to clarify; if actual explanations are ontic
and there are norms of good and bad explanations to clarify, then it appears that
ontic explanations are good and bad after all; or, if ontic explanations aren’t good or
bad but there are norms of good and bad explanations to clarify, then it would seem
that actual explanations aren’t ontic” (2018, p.1022).
This whole attempted problematic neatly illustrates the utility of the semantic ascent.
Craver (2014) evades this “triad” by making the semantic ascent, recognizing four distinct
senses of the term “explanation,” including the ontic sense, plus several epistemic senses.4 Craver
makes no claim that only one of them is “actually” explanation, or that the others are somehow
illegitimate ways to use the term “explanation.” Craver asserts that some explanations are ontic,
4See fn.3 above.
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not that all are. Explanations in an ontic sense aren’t good or bad, but explanations in an epistemic
sense are. Craver maintains there is a kind of fundamentality associated with ontic explanations
(what Sheredos 2016 called “normative priority”). In Craver’s view, the good-making properties of
any epistemic explanation are constrained by ontic explanations. This doesn’t mean that epistemic
explanations are somehow not (in one sense) explanations, nor that ontic explanation are themselves
suddenly normatively evaluable. WvE’s “inconsistent triad” is thus dissolved.
WvE consider allowing the ontic theorist to take this route. They claim that it amounts to
abandoning the ontic view, and giving up the “master argument” for the ontic view:
“To conceive of explanations as entities that can satisfy ontic constraints or norms
as a measure of their goodness just is to conceive of explanations as representational
entities. But any such conception will be inconsistent with premises (6) and (7)
of the master argument... [T]he ontic constraints account is... a concession [to the
epistemic view]” (2018, p.1024).
As noted, I think abandoning the “master argument” is a very good thing for ontic theorists to
do. But I do not see how the ontic theorist risks inconsistency: conceiving of some explanations
as representational is not inconsistent with conceiving of other (i.e., ontic) explanations as not
representational.5 WvE complain that if we take this route, we have traded in “ontic explanations”
for only “ontic constraints” that must be satisfied by epistemic explanations. They claim this leaves
us with only “the general platitude that the world co-determines truth value... consequently, ontic
constraints on [epistemic] explanations are unmasked as being just a subset of the familiar alethic
and epistemic constraints on world-directed representations” (2018, p.1024).
I offer three responses. First, I do not see why the ontic theorist is not permitted to say that
“ontic constraints” amount to a demand that epistemic explanations track ontic explanations, so I
do not see how talk of constraints requires abandoning an ontic conception of explanation. Only
if one already presumes that epistemic explanations are more fundamental would one see reason
here to abandon talk of ontic explanations; in this way the argument begs the question, by failing
to let the ontic theorist mean one of the things they should like to mean by “explanation.”
Second, if overlap between the two views is quite so clear, it is unclear why bragging rights
go immediately to the epistemic view. The ontic theorist might just as aptly accuse the epistemic
theorist of “conceding” if they recognize that discrete bits of the world (ontic explanations) play
a role co-determining the success of epistemic explanations. Why aren’t claims about epistemic
explanations “unmasked” as claims about familiar psychological and pragmatic constraints on
humans who seek (ontic) explanations (cf. Craver 2007, p.28)?
Third, however, arguments like Sheredos’ (2016) suggest the overlap is not quite so clear,
and that the idea of epistemic explanations involving “world-directed representations” is far from
platitudinous. In his view, general explanations cannot be readily and unproblematically understood
as “mapping” to ontic structures in the world. WvE appeared to endorse this line of thought in
their second argument: their suggestion was that general explanations could at best correspond to
“abstracta” that could not count as ontic explanations.6 As Sheredos put it, in general explanations
5See fn.3 above.
6Sheredos’ core argument wasn’t over whether abstracta could have causal powers, or whether
they could count as ontic explanations, but rather about whether their existence (which one can
posit, if one likes) can put unidirectional constraints on epistemic explanations.
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“the truth about things in the world cannot independently matter in the way the ontic view requires”
(2016, p.927). Now, Sheredos uses these claims to challenge ontic views’ ability to accommodate
general explanations – but they show just as well that WvE’s third argument is in tension with
their second: asserting the epistemic view’s commitment to “world-directed representations” is
far too glib if the epistemic explanations that allegedly “matter most to the scientific community”
cannot readily be seen to correspond to entities in the world. Sheredos argues that it is in precisely
cases like these – where things in the world are not clearly decisive for epistemic success – that
the significance of epistemic approaches to explanation is most clear. I see ample room for
significant debate between the epistemic and ontic views here, suggesting that the debate has not
been “conceded.”
5. Concluding Remarks
Wright & van Eck mis-characterize Sheredos’ view as one in which we have “abandoned... the
debate” between epistemic and ontic views (2018, p.1024). What we abandon instead are verbal
disputes that distract from productive work. There remains ample room for productive debate as we
pursue the normative turn, sorting out where and how the different conceptions of explanation are
philosophically useful in analyzing scientific practice. The first step towards this productive debate
is to abandon arguments like Wright & van Eck’s, which fail to make the semantic ascent, beg the
question against opponents, and accomplish little. Re-consider the title of their article in light of
their actual arguments: “ontic explanation is either ontic, or it is [epistemically] explanatory, but
not both.” Well, yes, I suppose.
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